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A “Little Berlin Wall” for all: discursive construction across scales
edward Boyle
Abstract
Since 2013, Russian Border Security Forces have been con-
structing border fences at various points along the Adminis-
trative Boundary Line that separates the de facto state of South 
Ossetia from the remainder of Georgian territory. This process 
of ‘borderization’ materializes what was formerly an adminis-
trative fiction on the ground, seeking to territorially demarcate 
the divide between the two communities. The fence in question 
has come to be referred to as the “Little Berlin Wall” inherently 
comparing some comparatively insubstantial stretches of fenc-
ing and barbed wire with the imposing concrete fortifications 
that served to divide East and West Berlin at the height of the 
Cold War.
This article argues for the utility of the notion of a discursive 
construction in analysing this border. The notion will be used to 
clarify how this superficially unjustifiable comparison indicates 
that the Administrative Boundary Line is both shaped by and 
restructuring the regional geography of Europe. The invoca-
tion of the Berlin Wall emphasizes that this material fencing 
divides Georgia. The effects of its deployment are felt at various 
scales, from how this boundary is seen as an illegitimate divi-
sion of sovereign Georgian territory, to its role in constructing 
Europe’s outer edge. The geographical and temporal division 
of Tbilisi-controlled Georgia from what lies on the other side 
of the “illegal” boundary works to incorporate Georgia firmly 
within Europe.
This discursive construction at Europe’s outer edge also in-
dicates both the importance of border processes occurring at 
the margins of a regional geographic entity and how the local, 
national and wider regional scales are able to be tied together 
within Europe’s post-Cold War borders.
Georgia; South Ossetia; Borders; Europe; Scale; Discursive Con-
struction
Zusammenfassung
Eine „kleine Berliner Mauer“ für alle: Maßstabübergreifen-
de diskursive Konstruktion 
Seit 2013 haben russische Grenzsicherheitskräfte Grenzzäune 
an verschiedenen Punkten entlang der Verwaltungsgrenze er-
richtet, die den de-facto-Staat Südossetien vom Restgebiet von 
Georgien trennt. Dieser Prozess der Grenzziehung hatte zum 
Ziel, etwas Realität werden zu lassen, was zuvor räumlich und 
verwaltungsmäßig Fiktion war, indem man die Trennung zwi-
schen zwei Gemeinden territorial abgrenzen wollte. Der infrage 
stehende Grenzzaun wird inzwischen als „kleine Berliner Mau-
er“ bezeichnet, indem man einige unwesentliche Zaunabschnit-
te und Stacheldraht mit den imposanten Betonfestungen ver-
gleicht, die während des Höhepunkts des Kalten Krieges dazu 
dienten, Ost- und Westberlin zu trennen.
Dieser Artikel erörtert den Nutzwert der Vorstellung einer dis-
kursiven Konstruktion, um uns zu ermöglichen, die Wirkung 
dieses vordergründig ungerechtfertigten Vergleichs zu untersu-
chen, wie es dazu kam, dass ABL durch die regionale Geographie 
von Europa sowohl geformt als auch umstrukturiert werden 
konnte. Die Verwendung des Begriffs einer „kleinen Berliner 
Mauer“ ist das Ergebnis sowohl der materiellen Abzäunung ei-
nes Teils des souveränen Staatsgebiets von Georgien, als auch 
der Rolle, die der Fall der Berliner Mauer im Verständnis von 
Europa in der Zeit nach dem kalten Krieg gespielt hat. Ähnlich 
werden dessen Auswirkungen in unterschiedlichen Maßstäben 
verspürt. Das beginnt damit, wie diese Grenze als rechtswidrige 
Abtrennung des souveränen Staatsgebiets von Georgien ver-
standen wird, über deren laufenden Ausbau als Außengrenze 
von Europa, was bezeichnend für die geographische und zeitli-
che Trennung des von Tiflis kontrollierten Georgiens von dem 
ist, was auf der anderen Seite dieser „illegalen“ Grenze liegt, bis 
hin zur festen Eingliederung von Georgien in Europa.
Die bei dieser Verwendung der diskursiven Konstruktion sicht-
baren Wirkungen auf die Außengrenze Europas weisen sowohl 
auf die Bedeutung der Grenzprozesse hin, die an den Rändern 
einer regionalen geographischen Einheit stattfinden, als auch 
auf die gleichzeitige Anwendung binärer Logik von Bewegung 
und Beständigkeit innerhalb der Grenzen Europas nach dem 
kalten Krieg.
Georgien; Südossetien; Grenzen; Europa; Maßstab; Diskursive 
Konstruktion
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The „Little Berlin Wall“
In August 2015, it was reported that the 
Georgian director Toma Chagelishvili 
was editing a film entitled “Little Berlin 
Wall”, shot the previous year in the Geor-
gian village of Khurvaleti. Khurvaleti is 
located along the Administrative Bound-
ary Line (ABL) that separates territory 
controlled by Tbilisi from that under the 
authority of the largely unrecognized 
state of South Ossetia and their princi-
pal backers, the Russian Federation. The 
report announced that the film would 
seek to document the daily struggles of 
the villagers as they go about their lives 
in the shadows of the barbed wire fences 
recently thrown up by Russian border 
guards (Agenda.ge 2015). In addition to 
being a record of these local struggles, 
though, the film’s title indicates its own 
awareness of their wider political reso-
nance; presented as manifestations of a 
phenomenon thought left behind in the 
previous century, but one of increasing 
contemporary relevance. The Berlin Wall 
came to symbolize the divide between 
the West and the Soviet Union, and its 
fall in 1989 is understood as the moment 
in which the conflict between these two 
competing ideological systems came to an 
end (Ash 2014). In the years since, and 
particularly since 2001, it has come to at-
tain a perhaps even more pervasive sig-
nificance, in which its fall represents the 
immanence of a truly globalized world, 
one which would be characterized by an 
absence of the sort of materialized barri-
ers between peoples and states that the 
Berlin Wall, in particular, came to stand 
for. 
This paper will argue that the manner in 
which a relatively obscure conflict in a re-
gion that remains remote for the majority 
of Europeans has come to be associated 
with a geopolitical event of such central 
significance as the Berlin Wall and its fall 
offers an insight into the new regional ge-
ography of Europe. Superficially, there ap-
pears to be very little relation between the 
vast militarized complex of concrete walls, 
towers and the constant threat of state-
sanctioned violence that characterized 
this most extreme of division between 
the worlds of capitalism and communism 
played out along the boundary between 
East and West Berlin, and what is, even at 
its most clearly demarcated, a thin, snak-
ing, and uneven lines of fencing or barbed 
wire across which people communicate 
and exchange goods, and around which 
people are occasionally apprehended 
but where, for the moment anyway, they 
remain mercifully unlikely to experience 
fatal violence. This emphasizes that the 
relation between the two is constituted 
through the deployment of the discursive 
construction of the “Berlin Wall” to explain 
its “Little” counterpart. While the latter is 
objectively of a far lesser scale, it has come 
to serve a similar rhetorical function, but 
with one crucial difference. While the 
Berlin Wall was a division within not just 
Germany, but Europe as a whole, its “Lit-
tle” cousin is a rhetorical device that seeks 
to position the part of Georgia under Tbi-
lisi’s control as within Europe. The other 
side of the fence is presented as beyond 
the pale, standing apart from the modern 
civilization that the fall of the Berlin Wall 
was thought to presage. 
This analysis of the deployment of the 
notion of the “Little Berlin Wall” will show 
us how this discursively-produced bor-
dering process resonates across spatial 
scales within a new regional geography. It 
emphasizes how the significance of such a 
boundary is not solely territorial, but re-
sults from the manner in which its mean-
ing is ascribed and deployed through its 
appearance within wider discourses. The 
hypothesis is that the deployment of the 
discursive construction of the Berlin Wall 
in order to refer to the ABL has influenced 
the way in which the boundary has been 
responded to. Invocation of the Berlin 
Wall has allowed for the various scales at 
which this boundary may be said to exist 
(local, national, regional, and global) to be 
brought together. 
In order to show the multiscalar ef-
fect of this discursive construction, the 
study offers a material explanation for 
the origins and effects of this boundary 
constructed along the ABL between Geor-
gia and South Ossetia. The interpretation 
offered here is based on the author’s 
fieldwork and interviews with those re-
sponsible for monitoring the boundary on 
a daily basis, as well as reports produced 
by local news organizations and interna-
tional bodies. A narrative analysis of the 
boundary’s description seeks to establish 
the role that the ABL’s representation as 
a “Little Berlin Wall” has played in mak-
ing the meaning of the boundary. Through 
this, the study will analyse the material 
and ideational effects of the deployment 
of this particular discursive construction. 
This paper will proceed as follows. 
First, it shall indicate the significance 
of borders within Europe, understand-
ing borders as processes that occur at a 
number of scales, and argue that it is the 
“over-determination” of borders is what 
allows them to exist at these various 
scales. Second, it will define what a dis-
cursive construction is and how it works 
to over-determine meaning at multiple 
scales. In the third section, an account 
of the borderization occurring along the 
ABL is offered. The fourth section will ex-
amine the meaning ascribed to the Berlin 
Wall in the years since its fall. Section five 
will show the effects that the deployment 
of the discursive construction of the Ber-
lin Wall has had for Georgia, while the 
sixth section will consider the same at a 
more European, regional level. The pa-
per will analyse the material and idea-
tional context within which the notion 
of the Berlin Wall is deployed, and what 
influence this has had on perceptions of 
the boundary at various scales. Doing so 
emphasizes that while discourses pro-
duce both material and symbolic effects, 
they are also materially and symbolically 
produced. The focus of this study is on 
the co-existence of these two distinct yet 
related processes. 
Scaling the borders of Europe
Attention paid to the study of borders 
within a regional setting is of course noth-
ing new. For states, national boundaries 
form the territorial limits of the nation, 
where they exist as, simultaneously, in-
struments of state policy, the expression 
and means of government power, and 
markers of national identity (Anderson 
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1996). As nations are defined by their 
frontiers, regional geographies are simi-
larly described by their limits, whether 
viewed as existing within or beyond the 
boundaries of the state, and are available 
as political resources to be mobilized in 
a similar, functionally-differentiated way 
as those borders termed national (Paasi 
1996). The development and expansion 
of the European Union led to a flurry of 
work that sought to move beyond inter-
national boundaries by emphasizing the 
importance of studying borders at other 
scales, such as those occurring at the lo-
cal, regional and supranational scales 
(Liikanen 2010). Nevertheless, in such 
formulations, borders tend to be defined 
by the geographical scale at which they 
are seen as functioning, with the notion 
of geographical scale itself forming a 
levelled or “nested hierarchy” (Howitt 
2003; Swyngedouw 2004). While disag-
gregating political activity and ascribing 
it to a particular scale may be analyticaly 
convenient and even essential for theoret-
ical development, it undoubtedly skates 
over a politics of scale in which “relations 
of power and authority by actors and in-
stitutions operat[e] and situat[e] them-
selves at different spatial scales”, and 
where different scales, such as the local, 
the national, the regional, or the global, 
lack a truly autonomous existence, with 
processes seemingly occurring at one 
scale influencing others (Leitner 2004, 
p. 238). Consequently, this paper shall 
understand a border as existing on mul-
tiple scales, although these scales are not 
ontologically-prior to the wider systems 
within which the border exists, being co-
constituted through the networks within 
which the borders in question function. 
Frequently, the notion of a geographic 
region has been utilized to provide an 
expression of geographical area that is 
not contingent with the territory of the 
nation state, in order to allow for a dis-
cussion of processes occurring over dif-
ferent geographical scale. In such studies, 
the borders of the region are defined by 
the object under discussion. Neverthe-
less, with the expansion of interest in 
border studies, and increasing attention 
to the notion of borders as existing “eve-
rywhere” (Balibar 2002), what consti-
tutes a meaningful border has come to 
be somewhat arbitrarily determined by 
the interests of the researcher. By con-
trast, this study shall focus its attention 
upon the object that initially gave rise to 
boundary studies or limology, the con-
scious effort to materialize a “bounded 
space” to serve as the territory of the 
state. The boundary in question is that 
which exists between the Republic of 
Georgia and the de facto state of South 
Ossetia. However, speaking from the per-
spective of international law, this border 
does not exist. According to the European 
Union and the vast majority of nation-
states in world politics, this boundary 
is illegal, an unconstitutional division of 
the territorial integrity of Georgia by an 
unrecognized political entity, the Repub-
lic of South Ossetia, with the backing of 
the Russian Federation. The demarcation 
and materialization of this boundary line 
on the ground has been consistently op-
posed by the state of Georgia, which re-
fuses to recognize it as an international 
border (by stationing border guards or 
customs officials there, for example) and 
refers to it as an Administrative Bound-
ary Line, or ABL.
The argument in this paper is that 
while this border may not exist in terms 
of legal epistemology, nevertheless we are 
able to usefully discuss the role that rep-
resentations of this border perform at a 
variety of scales. Following Lefebvre, it 
is contended that the “representation of 
space matters” and that these represen-
tations “have a substantial role and spe-
cific influence on the production of space” 
(1991, p. 42). The appeal of the state to 
the illegality of the ABL seeks to impose 
a particular vision upon the boundary it-
self, and is clearly one which designed to 
create the world rather than merely rep-
resent it (Agnew 2003, p. 7). Neverthe-
less, even while the Georgian state claims 
the illegality of this boundary, it is unable 
to avoid recognizing the fact that there 
exists a border across what it claims as 
its sovereign territory. The result is that 
what becomes represented is no longer a 
“mere boundary”, as the varied meanings 
contained within this representation and 
the varied discourses within which they 
circulate cause the boundary to be “over-
determined” (Salter 2012, p. 737). Ac-
cording to Rumford (2012, p. 891), over-
determination is “a form of consensus 
generation” which seeks to emphasize 
the extra-local significance of a particu-
lar border. It is this over-determination 
of boundaries that allows them to tie to-
gether a variety of geographical scales, 
the “domestic, international and global” 
(Walker 2010). 
The above emphasizes the importance 
of analysing how the borders come to be 
over-determined, and come to embody a 
variety of meanings that not only jump 
scales, but also serve to tie the varied 
geographies within which this particular 
border is able to be represented together. 
It is argued here that this border is “over-
determined” through the deployment of 
what this paper shall term a discursive 
construction. This discursive construction 
is a pre-existing representation of bor-
ders that works to connect the intensely 
local bordering processes occurring in the 
foothills of the Caucasus with a particular 
representation of borders, one that brings 
with it a great deal of conceptual baggage 
for inhabitants throughout the Europe. 
The next section shall briefly sketch 
out an explanation of what is meant by 
a “discursive construction”. The remain-
der of this paper shall then be concerned 
with analysing how the representation of 
this border has been over-determined by 
unpacking the discursive construction of 
the Berlin Wall and analysing how it has 
come to be applied to the ABL that exists 
between Georgia and South Ossetia. This 
will enable us to examine how such dis-
cursive constructions operate, their rela-
tion to wider regional issues across vari-
ous scales and what this tells us about the 
nature of state border-making claims in 
the twenty-first century. 
Deploying discursive 
 constructions
The notion of discourse refers to the 
ways in which we confer meaning on our 
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physical and social surroundings. A dis-
course is a form of power, but one that 
circulates throughout the social order 
rather than being exercised in a top-down 
fashion, in contrast to how sovereignty is 
exercised by a state or its constituent in-
stitutions. A discourse forms a cohesive 
body of concepts, categories and ideas 
about an object which attempt to frame 
the object in question in a certain manner. 
This framing is utilized in order to pro-
vide the limits within which an object is 
open to being acted upon. A discourse in-
fluences how an object is able to be acted 
upon by circumscribing the limits within 
which action towards it can be made to 
make sense. Described in this fashion, 
discourse appears as merely an ideation-
al mode of explanation, one that focusses 
on the production of meaning rather than 
material outcomes. From the perspective 
of the object in question, however, this 
distinction between the ideational and 
the material collapses, as what is said 
about something is directly related to 
what is done about it. That is, a transfor-
mation of the ideational environment in 
which sense is made of an object will alter 
what it means, just as a transformation in 
the material circumstances within which 
the object exists will (refer particularly to 
Lebow 2009; Epstein 2008). 
A discursive construction refers to an 
attempt to set the discursive limits within 
which an object exists through referring 
to other object(s) in order to character-
ize its nature. For example, in the conflict 
over the Russian takeover of Crimea, the 
description of Russia’s actions as “an-
nexation” discursively constructs Crimea 
as an object whose possession by Russia 
has a particular meaning, in this case one 
that necessitates sanctions by the United 
States, Europe and the G7. The meaning 
accorded Crimea through this discursive 
construction is totally different from that 
accorded by contrasting descriptions that 
focussed on Sevastopol (its importance to 
the Russian nation), Khrushchev’s illegit-
imate gift of the territory to the UkrSSR 
(it is rightly Russian), and the “vote for 
union with Russia” undertaken prior to 
Russia’s formal absorption of the territory 
(its inhabitants desire to be Russia). Con-
sequently, the limits of a meaningful re-
sponse towards this material reality, Rus-
sia’s absorption of the formerly Ukrainian 
autonomous region of Crimea, is shaped 
by the discursive construction utilized to 
make sense of it. Depending on the con-
struction adopted, the relative meaning 
of the material fact of Russian control is 
altered, as are the limits within which 
responses to this fact are made to make 
sense.
However, the sense-making driven by 
such discursive constructions is itself 
dependent upon the scale at which such 
constructions are mobilized. If the above 
example is analysed at a regional, Eu-
ropean scale, for example, discursively 
constructing Russian rule over Crimea 
as annexation positions such a material 
reality as being in violation of Europe-
an norms and values that have shaped 
the continent’s politics since the Sec-
ond World War. Alternatively, however, 
noting it as being the revision of an un-
natural situation in which one ethnicity 
was ruled by the state of another, or as 
having come about as a result of the ex-
pressed wish of the Crimean population, 
are ones which are made to appeal to a 
different set of ideals with which Europe 
constitutes itself. In either case, what 
must be emphasized is how such efforts 
of sense-making with reference to Europe 
are themselves constituted at a variety of 
scales (Europe’s role within global poli-
tics, questions of ethnicity and the state, 
the wishes of local residents), meaning 
that these constructions are affected by 
and produce influence over discourse oc-
curring at multiple scales.
The above has sought to offer a justifi-
cation for examining notions of borders 
and scale within a regional geographic 
framework through the notion of a dis-
cursive construction, while remaining at 
a relatively high level of abstraction. The 
following sections shall examine how the 
Berlin Wall has been materially and idea-
tionally constructed between Georgia and 
South Ossetia, before moving on to exam-
ine the effects of this construct upon ge-
ographies at various scales.
Building Walls
An understanding of the boundary which 
separates territory controlled by Tbilisi 
from the area administered by Tskhin-
vali as a “Little Berlin Wall” is the result 
of a process referred to as “borderiza-
tion”. Borderization is defined as the “the 
process of the installation of razor wire 
and barbed wire fences, so called ‘border’ 
signs and other artificial obstacles along 
the occupation lines” that separate the 
territory controlled by Tbilisi from that 
“occupied” by Russia (Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of Georgia 2016, p. 1, 4). 
These occupied territories are two areas 
of Georgia internationally recognized as 
being part of the Republic of Georgia, but 
that following the war in August 2008, 
were recognized by the Russian Federa-
tion as constituting the sovereign states 
of the Republic of Abkhazia and Republic 
of South Ossetia (Fig. 1). Georgia refers to 
these areas as the Autonomous Republic 
of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali District 
and considers them as occupied by Rus-
sia; this article will henceforth follow 
convention in English and refer to them 
as Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is with 
the Occupation Line/ABL between South 
Ossetia and “Georgia proper” that this ar-
ticle is concerned. 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, 
South Ossetia was widely recognized as 
forming one of four “de-facto states” with-
in post-Soviet space that emerged with 
the breakup of the Soviet Union (Mirskiĭ 
1997). Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
attempted to secede from Georgia prior 
to the latter’s independence, and together 
with Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria, 
these four ‘unrecognized entities’ expe-
rienced interethnic conflict and ethnic 
cleansing (George 2009; Toft 2003) as a 
result of the ethnicization of politics that 
occurred amidst the growing nationalism 
of the late-Soviet period (Jones 2006). Af-
ter the disintegration of the USSR, all four 
functioned as semi-stable political admin-
istrations largely outside of the control of 
the states within which they were located, 
with each being dominated by a de-facto 
political authority supported by the Rus-
sian Federation (although in the case 
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of Nagorno-Karabakh more indirectly, 
through Armenia). The coming to power 
of Mikhail Saakashvili’s United National 
Movement (UNM) in Tbilisi in 2003, and 
its promises to reassert Georgia’s terri-
torial integrity (Kabachnik 2012), cul-
minated in the August War of 2008 and 
subsequent recognition of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia as independent states by 
the Russian Federation. 
The borderization process is driven 
by the efforts of the largely unrecogniz-
ed state of South Ossetia and their Rus-
sian backers to assert the existence of a 
boundary between the territory of Geor-
gia and that of South Ossetia. Borderiza-
tion materializes what was formerly a 
line on the map as what we might term 
a “fortified boundary” snaking across 
the fields of the Southern Caucasus. Ac-
cording to Hassner and Wittenberg, 
fortified boundaries are “distinguished 
from conventional interstate boundaries 
by virtue of their physical appearance, 
which is designed to enhance border 
control” and from “militarized bounda-
ries because of their asymmetrical ori-
gin and intent” (2015). The concept of 
fortified boundaries provides a good 
description for the construction of ar-
tificial barriers to suggest the physical 
separation of these two territories and 
the asymmetrical imposition of control 
through the patrols of Russian and irreg-
ular South Ossetian forces. This means of 
asserting authority over the physical ter-
ritory of the putative Republic of South 
Ossetia also works to impose it upon 
the local Georgian population, cement-
ing the existence of the former in their 
minds and delegitimizing Tbilisi’s claims 
to authority. The fence thus serves as a 
clear, unambiguous marker of the state’s 
sovereign rule, incorporating a display of 
military power in order to assert its au-
thority to the disputed territory (John-
son and Jones 2014). In this respect, the 
borderization process serves to proclaim 
the disputed sovereignty of South Osse-
tia (Boyle 2016).
South Ossetia and, more importantly, 
the Russian Federation deem the cur-
rent Republic of South Ossetia as having 
borders identical with those of the South 
Ossetian Administrative Oblast (SOAO) 
of 1922. The view widely held in Georgia 
and elsewhere, that the establishment of 
the SOAO was the result of a Soviet policy 
of “divide-and-rule” towards its various 
nationalities (Martin 2001; Kappeler 
2001) fails to account for its origins as a 
means of accommodating the separatist 
demands of Ossetian Bolsheviks within 
the Soviet state (Saparov 2010). This 
view therefore underemphasizes the ad 
hoc nature of these administrative fictions 
and overlooks how they were only open 
territorial mobilization following the So-
viet Union’s fall. In fact, borderization be-
tween Georgia and South Ossetia is part 
of a problem common to the post-Soviet 
period, of bringing political and ethnic 
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boundaries into alignment. As Reeves 
has shown, it is not only the four “de fac-
to states” noted here that have struggled 
with the consequences of marking out 
and administrating material boundaries 
over what had previously been mere lines 
on the map (2014). In this case, though, 
the actual work of patrolling and main-
taining the border is largely in the hands 
of the Russian Federation’s Federal Secu-
rity Service (FSB) rather than the govern-
ment of South Ossetia, in accordance with 
an agreement between the two initially 
signed in 2009. Broers astutely notes 
how, “Ironically, Russian recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia provided re-
sounding confirmation of the Saakashvili 
administration’s efforts to reframe, and 
geopoliticize, Georgia’s conflicts to the 
Georgia–Russia level, sublimating and 
rendering irrelevant the Georgian-Abk-
haz and Georgian-South Ossetian levels 
of conflict” (2014, pp. 153–154)
It was villages inhabited by Georgian 
residents located close to this ABL, such 
as Dvani and Ditsi as well as Khurvaleti, 
which from the spring of 2013 onwards 
saw fences and barbed wire being erected 
by Russian border guards (Fig. 2). This 
occurred following the parliamentary 
elections held in October 2012 that had 
handed a decisive defeat to the UNM and 
Mikhail Saakashvili. The winners of the 
election, the Georgian Dream coalition 
led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, who had been 
presented by the UNM as being under the 
control of Russia, announced that they 
would be more willing to accommodate 
Russian interests in order to improve re-
lations. Nevertheless, despite, or perhaps 
because of, this more conciliatory ap-
proach from Tbilisi, the following year 
saw a sustained period of artificial bar-
rier construction along South Ossetia’s 
ABL. This created situations in which vil-
lagers were no longer able “to visit their 
cemetery, use agricultural lands, irrigation 
and drinking water, as well as emergency 
medical services” (Democracy and Free-
dom Watch 2013). The new Georgian gov-
ernment began to brief the international 
community on this fencing and use the 
term “borderisation” from the summer of 
that year (Civil Georgia 2013). 
The borderization process has pro-
ceeded in fits and starts since, with most 
of the fence construction occurring in 
spring or summer, although according 
to the European Union Monitoring Mis-
sion (EUMM) such construction was 
East-West Highway
E60
E60
Ergneti
Ditsi
Dvani
Khurvaleti
Gori
TSKHINVALI
GEORGIA
SOUTH OSSETIA
TBILISI
SOUTH
OSSETIA
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
GEORGIA
TURKEY
ARMENIA
AZER-
BAIJAN
BLACK
SEA
0 10 km
Scale approx. 1 : 480 000city
village
administrative capitalTSKHINVALI
Dvani
Gori
administrative boundary
important main road
main road
urban area
IfL 2017
Author: E. Boyle
Cartography: T. Balcke
The administrative boundary line between Georgia and South Ossetia
Fig. 2: The administrative boundary line between Georgia and South Ossetia
Europa Regional 24, 2016 (2017) I 1-2 
86
most marked in 2013, and by late 2015 
appeared to have largely abated. This 
reflects the fact that currently “the total 
length of razor wire and barbed wire 
fences and other artificial obstacles along 
the occupation line in Tskhinvali Region 
is nearly 52 km”. Although the South Os-
setian occupation line totals more than 
350 km, most of this runs over exceed-
ingly harsh or uninhabited terrain (Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 
2016, p. 4). Consequently, by this stage, 
the artificial barriers running “through 
local villager’s orchards, yards, grazing 
fields, agricultural plots and cemeteries” 
(Agenda.ge 2016) have largely separated 
the Georgian and South Ossetian popula-
tions in those areas along the ABL where 
they were most likely to come into con-
tact. Villagers finding themselves fenced 
in on the South Ossetian side are forced 
to cross “illegally” to access schools, jobs, 
health care, and relatives in Georgia, and 
their detention along the ABL by Russian 
border guards or local South Ossetian 
forces have continued. Tskhinvali and 
Russian Border Guards insist that such 
detentions are for “violations of the bor-
der”. Detainees have been generally re-
leased after being fined, but are entirely 
at the mercy of the authorities in Tskhin-
vali (Civil Georgia 2017). 
Georgia maintains that the territory 
claimed by South Ossetia is occupied by 
Russia. It views borderization as a Rus-
sian policy of creeping form of territorial 
annexation, one that both serves to divide 
both communities and people from their 
livelihood. The process also violates the 
ceasefire agreement that ended the 2008 
conflict, which called for the return of Rus-
sian troops to their pre-conflict positions. 
The international community largely sup-
ports Georgia in these criticisms. In July 
2016, for instance, the OSCE Parliamen-
tary Assembly deplored “the process of 
the installation of razor wire fences and 
embankments by the Russian occupation 
forces along the occupation line, dividing 
the local population and depriving them 
of fundamental rights and freedoms” (for 
this and other examples, see Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2016: 5). 
Seen from this perspective, the effects of 
the process of borderization are intensely 
local, relating as they do to the ability of 
individuals to access territory and re-
sources, and prohibitions on freedom of 
movement (Photograph 1). Georgia is cor-
rect that these prohibitions do not merely 
effect the local Georgian population, but 
also make life difficult for the South Os-
setian villagers on the other side of the 
ABL (Delegation of Georgia 2016). It is 
for this reason that Georgia has consist-
ently argued that borderization is “di-
rected against de-escalation of the conflict 
and directed towards preventing people 
from finding common language” (Civil 
Georgia 2014). Nevertheless, the fencing 
introduced after 2008 mirrored earlier 
policy prescriptions previously pursued 
with vigour by the Georgian state, such 
as the demolition of the Ergneti market 
by the Georgian government in 2004. As 
Sahlins has noted, “The boundary and the 
nation were not imposed on these people; 
they pushed for its enforcement” through 
the presence of state institutions that 
provided the framework to handle their 
local conflicts and ideology (1989). The 
result of almost three decades of political 
and ethnic conflict within the region has 
been the disengagement of Georgians and 
South Ossetians economically, socially, and 
culturally. 
The fencing involved in the borderi-
zation process, then, is also a symbol of 
this disengagement, rather than just the 
means to bring it about. While there is 
nothing primordial or timeless about 
South Ossetia, its claims for existence as 
a state have necessitated fixing the terri-
tory of South Ossetia through the fencing 
out its geographical space. The material 
effects of the fence are felt at the local 
level, but it is the continued (re)produc-
tion of the border, through the discourse 
that surrounds this borderization pro-
cess, which grants these artificial barri-
ers such performative power. In invoking 
a global symbol of division by describing 
this snaking course of barbed wire and 
lengths of chain-link fencing as a “Little 
Berlin Wall”, Chagelishvili is not merely 
seeking to position the barrier in Khur-
valeti and elsewhere as being of wider 
interest. He is also taking advantage of 
the connections already drawn between 
the various scales within which these 
barriers are symbolically mobilized. In 
so doing, he is transforming the tableaux 
upon which this “Little” wall exists to 
Photograph 1: Fence on the Administrative Boundary Line near Khurvaleti, Georgia 2015 
(Edward Boyle)
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something much broader. Such a process 
is made possible by the way in which 
events in Khurvaleti are made to discur-
sively connect with those in Berlin a quar-
ter of a century previously, as well as by 
how the Berlin Wall has been interpreted 
in the intervening period. 
Walling Europe
The fall of the wall, collapse of the War-
saw pact and subsequent disintegration 
of a number of the multi-ethnic states that 
existed within or were associated with the 
Eastern bloc nevertheless brought with it 
the promise of seeing not merely the cul-
mination of a process of constructing a 
global order of modern sovereign states. 
Instead the European Union held out the 
promise that we would see the develop-
ment of a new mode of political order. The 
seemingly inexorable expansion of both 
the Union and the number of countries 
within the Schengen Area suggested that 
the European Union, and consequently 
Europe itself, were embarked upon a pro-
cess of simultaneously closer and more 
extensive integration. In presenting itself 
as a new political form, the EU had sought 
to position itself as lacking the necessity 
of sharply-defining itself against another 
territory (Prozorov 2008). In fact, the 
other against whom Europe would come 
to define itself against was its own past, 
the bordered and territorially-demarcated 
nation-state (Waever 1998). This trans-
formation into a new form of political 
community was rendered possible by the 
ending of Cold War and the disintegration 
of those barriers, like the Berlin Wall, that 
restricted the free movement of peoples. 
Consequently, the fall of the wall came to 
stand for the emergence of new political 
possibilities, one in which Europe would 
once again serve as a normative model for 
the rest of the world, though this time for 
its regionally-fuzzy borders, rather than 
the hard territorial ones of the nation-
state. This was the context in which a 
globalization sweeping before it the sov-
ereignty of the state came to be celebrated.
While the EU project is frequently asso-
ciated with globalization and prevalence 
of cross border flows indicative of the 
decline in nation state sovereignty, the 
external borders of the Union are in some 
ways no less hard than their internal pre-
decessors, and indeed have become fairly 
“sharp” markers of difference (Scott and 
van Houtum 2009). There were already 
extensive criticism of the apparent devel-
opment of a “Fortress Europe” and the way 
in which the “fuzzy” internal borders of 
the Union contrasted with its extensively 
fortified and securitized outer boundaries 
(Pinos 2013). These have been amplified 
by the effects of the refugee crisis over the 
last two years, with the reestablishment 
of border controls between a number of 
Schengen states and the throwing up of 
barbed wire along the Union’s internal 
borders, have come to make the pro-
nouncements of a “borderless” Europe ap-
pear as premature at best. The Berlin Wall, 
and particularly the poignancy afforded by 
the 25th anniversary of its fall in November 
2014, served as an occasion to decry this 
recent spate of wall construction occurring 
both within and beyond Europe. As Thorb-
jørn Jagland, Council of Europe Secretary-
General, noted on 23 August 2015, “It’s 25 
years since the Berlin Wall came down, 
it’s not a good time to start building new 
walls in Europe again, we should abso-
lutely avoid it”. Nevertheless, the new ma-
terialized forms of boundary enforcement 
seen in the EU do not find themselves rhe-
torically linked with the Berlin Wall in the 
same way as this borderization process in 
the South Caucasus. It is in the exceptional 
nature of the deployment of this discursive 
construction in Georgia that we are able 
to see the way in which the invocation of 
boundaries serves to both represent and 
materialize the rearrangement of multi-
layered regional geographies. 
Rebuilding Berlin in the Caucasus
A quarter of a century after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the borderization process, the 
fencing of the South Ossetian boundary, 
was presented as “a new Berlin Wall in 
the modern world” by the US Ambassa-
dor to Georgia, Richard Norland. In terms 
of the relative sophistication of these two 
fences, the comparison is unjustified, 
if not downright dishonest, in ignoring 
the presence of a far more sophisticated, 
expensive and brutal stretch of secured 
border along the US’s southern frontier. 
It is made effective because Norland is 
not looking to literally compare the for-
tified boundaries themselves, but rather 
to re-invoke the illegitimacy that the Ber-
lin Wall represented in preventing the 
movement of people within Germany. In 
doing so, of course, he is referencing the 
ultimate victory of the free movement of 
people and capital that the fall of the Ber-
lin Wall represented, the symbol of this 
age of globalization that was supposed 
to supplant the need for fences like those 
built on the South Ossetian boundary. 
The history of the conflict within South 
Ossetia suggests a classic narrative for the 
emergence of sovereignty, where control 
gained over people, achieved with the 
expulsion of the Georgian population, is 
followed by efforts to fix control of the 
state’s territory. The assumptions of the 
“territorial trap” highlighted by Agnew, 
with states as fixed units of space with a 
clear distinction between domestic and 
foreign that serve to “contain” society 
within its territorial borders (1994) are 
the same ones that motivate this borderi-
zation. Construction of the fence is firmly 
in line with public opinion in South Osse-
tia, which continues to display overwhelm-
ing support for the continued Russian 
military presence (Toal and O’Loughlin 
2013). This boundary fence, as with any 
infrastructural investment in the territory, 
is funded by the Russian state and manned 
by FSB troops, showing the dependence of 
a much-reduced population upon Russian 
largesse. The severing of any links across 
its boundary with (the rest of) Georgia 
confirms the integrity of South Ossetia 
and grants it sovereignty over not only 
this territory but history as well, aligning 
the boundaries of the putative Republic of 
South Ossetia with those of the South Os-
setian Autonomous Oblast, claiming it as 
sovereign in both space and time. Those 
aligning this boundary with the “Berlin 
Wall” are making claims regarding the le-
gitimacy of this particular fence, as well 
as the state in whose name it is being 
constructed. Indeed, the relation of this 
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borderization process with sovereignty is 
more opaque than in many of the examples 
looked at by Hassner and Wittenberg, 
due to the fact that, according to most of 
the world, the fence is not being construct-
ed on the border between two sovereign 
states. Certainly for the Georgian state, as 
well as the EU and US, the fence is quite 
simply an illegal act that can only impinge 
upon Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. The deployment of the discur-
sive construction of the Berlin Wall seeks 
to create consensus regarding the illegality 
of this material boundary being thrown up, 
which would otherwise reflect the sover-
eign will and territorial control of the state 
and people of South Ossetia. 
Through the notion of the Berlin Wall, 
the question of Georgia’s territory be-
comes imbricated with the regional geog-
raphy of Europe on several levels. The ABL 
is itself monitored by the EUMM, which is 
mandated to seek the stabilization of the 
security situation and normalization of 
life on the boundary, as well as building 
confidence between the two sides and in-
forming wider EU policy. At the same time, 
the ABL is also becoming the outer limits 
of a larger European zone of free move-
ment, with Georgia seeking to attain visa-
free travel to countries within the Schen-
gen zone. This “visa-free travel” comes 
as part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership 
Agreement, and was based upon Georgian 
compliance with the Action Plan on Visa 
Liberalization signed by Georgia and the 
EU. The “Little Berlin Wall” of the ABL has 
been frequently connected to the achieve-
ment of this goal. For instance, John Kerry 
noted in February 2014 that he was “an-
nouncing additional assistance by the 
United States to help support Georgia’s 
Euro-Atlantic vision, specifically to help 
Georgia achieve visa-free travel with the 
EU and to mitigate the hardships by bor-
derization along the occupied territories”. 
In December 2015 it was announced that 
the necessary provisions, such as “more 
secure documentation, including biomet-
ric passports; ‘integrated border manage-
ment’; and prevention of organized crime”, 
had been satisfied. During 2016 the ques-
tion of Schengen access for Georgians was 
caught up within larger issues involving 
proposed visa liberalization for Ukraine 
and Turkey, but in February 2017 it ap-
pears that visa liberalization for Georgian 
citizens is on the verge of being granted 
(European Parliament 2017).
Georgia’s inclusion within this visa-
free zone has been dependent upon co-
operation on a range of immigration and 
border-control issues, which effectively 
extends the EU’s law enforcement buffer 
zone far beyond the member states. This 
externalization of the EU’s domestic con-
trol functions extends an already contro-
versial “punitive model of migration man-
agement”, and as Slade notes, “the EU is 
ensuring that countries aspiring to mem-
bership but far beyond its borders are 
becoming the new frontiers of ‘Fortress 
Europe’” (2013). These frontiers include 
those of the ABL, with residents beyond 
it not in possession of Georgian passports 
and thus ineligible for the scheme. Indeed, 
in a manner that mimics the EU’s own 
offer of increased movement and trade 
with the union for those countries willing 
to cooperate with European regulations, 
Georgia has sought to dangle the carrot of 
a shared future of greater mobility with its 
breakaway territories. As Georgia’s Presi-
dent has consistently argued, for the pop-
ulation of the Occupied Territories, living 
in European Georgia will be more interest-
ing than living on the other side of barbed 
wire fences. South Ossetian participation 
“in building a modern democratic Euro-
pean Georgia” would mean that “Citizens 
of Tskhinvali will be able to travel, with-
out any visa, to Vienna, Berlin and Rome” 
(Tabula 2013). Access to Berlin for those 
on the other side of the ABL is of course 
dependent upon the removal of this “little 
Berlin Wall” that currently divides Geor-
gia from its “Ossetian brothers” (Govern-
ment of Georgia 2015).
That this adjustment in border control 
functions between the EU and Georgia 
should result in the rhetorical reaffirma-
tion of the boundary between Georgia 
and South Ossetia confirms what is often 
argued of borders under globalization. 
Recent border studies have highlighted 
the tendency of the latter to result in very 
uneven boundary effects, which facilitate 
movement in some cases but restrict it in 
others (Newman 2006; O’Dowd 2010). 
The achievement of visa-free travel for the 
bulk of Georgia’s citizens places a dramatic 
restriction on those resident on the far side 
of the ABL, who are deprived of the oppor-
tunity of enjoying access to the countries 
of Europe. In doing so, of course, it empha-
sizes how this notion of free movement is 
still dependent and beholden to the territo-
rial fixity of the state, in which the inscrip-
tion of the border and indeed the state re-
quires constant deployment of resources: 
the writing of the border, the state, and 
the world again and again (Walker 2010). 
Through Georgia’s success in negotiating 
visa-liberalization, the border itself con-
tinues to be constantly rewritten.
The European Theatre
In his work on Critical Geopolitics, Toal 
noted how a “backlash” by certain “ter-
ritorially based forces of local survival” 
can “territorialize globalization in such 
a way as to represent it as conflicts be-
tween nations, trading blocs, and civili-
zations. Seemingly anachronistic iden-
tities and dormant territorial disputes 
between states take on renewed sym-
bolic meanings amid the dislocations 
of globalization” (1996, p. 199). In the 
case of Georgia, such meanings are not 
just “renewed” but entirely novel, as the 
“Little Berlin Wall” between Georgia and 
South Ossetia has increasingly come to 
be rewritten as a division between Eu-
rope and what’s beyond it. Discussions of 
what constitutes the essence of Europe 
are complicated by Europe’s status as an 
undefined actor, “lacking autonomy over 
a homogenous, clearly-bordered space” 
(David 2008, p. 70). Although the “inside/
outside dichotomy at the EU’s edges has 
been further blurred since 2002” with the 
creation of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (Anderson 2007, p. 20), the at-
tempt to build a “European sieve” beyond 
the Union’s boundaries has reconstituted 
Georgia proper as the EU’s border, rewrit-
ing the ABL as the Union’s outer edge. Vi-
sa-free travel to the EU has materialized 
Georgian Tourism’s former slogan that 
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“Europe Started Here” (Ó Beacháin et al. 
2014), with the ABL coming to serve as 
the boundary for this zone of free move-
ment. 
While it may be true that the “world does 
not need another Berlin Wall” (Richard 
Norland, US Ambassador to Georgia, on 
January 22, 2015), Georgia’s performance 
of its European role required a “Little” one 
be discursively constructed. The equating 
of this boundary with that of the Berlin 
Wall ties the anachronistic character of 
this particular form of fencing to Europe’s 
own past, associating it with a temporal 
othering that serves to position Georgia 
as squarely within modern Europe (Diez 
2004). This is evidenced by Georgia’s in-
corporation within the zone of visa-free 
European travel, a move that positions 
the ABL as the divide between the past 
and future, one associated with the free 
movement of peoples within a European 
regional space. Through its incorporation 
within this discourse, the borderization 
between Georgia and South Ossetia has be-
come a character within a wider European 
drama. It comes to serve as a “political 
theater piece” (Agnew 2005) in a world 
where “international politics is produced 
as theatre”, with “geography the stage, 
politics the drama and geopolitics the de-
tached observation” (Toal 1996, 178). 
The theatrical nature of the fence and 
the characters involved in its construction 
is demonstrated by reaction to it. Rather 
than as a result of separation of politi-
cal visions between Georgian and South 
Ossetian leaderships, within Georgia the 
fence is currently presented as being their 
cause, as with current Georgian President 
Margvelashvili noting that borderization 
is “definitely directly against the people – 
against those people who want to see 
and meet each other beyond barbed wire 
fences”. This narrative appeals to the lo-
calness of the conflict, in a way that seeks 
to conceal the politics behind what is be-
ing fenced off. It is for this reason that: 
“It kind of reminds me of the Berlin 
Wall. People here are artificially sep-
arated from their fields, from their 
cemeteries. And it seems to me that 
even as the diplomatic negotiations 
take place in Geneva, it should be 
possible on humanitarian grounds 
for people to be able to move back 
and forth and to conduct their normal 
lives.” (Richard Norland, US Ambas-
sador to Georgia, on October 3, 2013)
The effect of this invocation of a Berlin 
Wall is that the varied meanings of the 
ABL come together to over-determine 
what is no longer a mere boundary. 
This rhetorical over-determination of 
the Little Berlin Wall works to reshape 
the regional geography of Europe, de-
cisively incorporating Georgia within 
Europe and providing it with “a notable 
rhetorical resource” that challenges the 
EU’s “initial attempt to use the ENP as a 
tool to demarcate the EU’s final borders” 
(Browning et al. 2010, p. 113). The notion 
of “Georgia, Europe Started Here” seeks to 
“return” Georgia to the European state 
fold from which they were but temporar-
ily separated by the Cold War (Hansen 
2006, pp. 39–40). The mobilization of 
this “Little Berlin Wall” therefore offers a 
clear example of the “constitutive power 
of outsiders” to set not only their terms 
of interaction with the centre, but to have 
an impact on the EU’s policies, its borders, 
and the identity and perception of its secu-
rity environment (Browning et al. 2010, 
p. 110). With the extension of the visa-free 
zone of movement up to the ABL, the EU 
finds itself responsible for monitoring the 
security situation at the external bounda-
ries of its own region of influence. This has 
simultaneously resulted from and driven 
the discursive construction of this fence as 
a “Little Berlin Wall”, which is deployed to 
both emphasize the illegitimacy of the di-
vision of Georgia, and its European destiny. 
Conclusion
The effectiveness of the Berlin Wall as a 
discursive construction stems from the 
manner in which its fall is used to narrate 
the post-Cold War period. The breakdown 
of the Warsaw Pact mediated via the Ber-
lin Wall is seen as the ending of the ille-
gitimate division of both the continent and 
Germany itself. At the same time, its fall is 
taken to signify the immanence of a new 
political moment, a period of unfettered 
movement between European states and 
the diminishing of border functions be-
tween them. Since 2003, Tbilisi has con-
sistently attempted to position Georgia as 
rightfully European, indeed, with its tour-
ist slogans, as the originator of what we 
understand as Europe. On one level, there-
fore, the Berlin Wall constructs the ABL as 
an illegitimate division of sovereign Geor-
gian territory, while also positioning it as 
the boundary between both the nation’s 
past and future and its European destiny. 
It is able to do this, despite the obvious 
differences in scale in the material mani-
festation of the border, because of how 
the discursive construction of the Berlin 
Wall serves as a referent with which we 
decipher the world (Foucault quoted in 
Shapiro 2009, p. 18). Georgia’s participa-
tion in a modern Europe characterized by 
cross-border movement is, however, de-
pendent upon the reluctant maintenance 
of a border between itself and a Russian-
backed South Ossetia that Tbilisi claims 
is illegal, but which serves to confirm its 
European location. Georgia’s European 
status is dependent upon this border, even 
as it opposes its presence. Its importance 
is shown in Chagelishvili’s documentary, 
circulating in film festivals throughout 
Europe, and in the process claiming this 
border, Georgia’s ABL, as Europe’s outer 
edge. This orients Georgia against both 
the other on the far side of this boundary, 
and Europe’s own past.
In this sense, the invocation of the ABL 
as being a “Little Berlin Wall” has proved 
effective for Georgia in repositioning it-
self within the European fold. The fence 
appears to serve a traditional function in 
demarcating the sovereign states’ territo-
rial limits and impeding free movement, 
seemingly impervious to the structural 
changes that came with globalization that 
were deemed to have greatly altered the 
modern border. The non-recognition of 
the Republic of South Ossetia by Georgia 
and open backing of this stance by the US 
and EU member states mean that Georgia’s 
constant appeals to its own sovereign au-
thority and territorial integrity result in 
its being part of a wider European region. 
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This is shown in the deployment of the 
“Little Berlin Wall” as a discursive con-
struction, which serves to tie together the 
local, small-scale restrictions in one cor-
ner of the world with a global narrative of 
movement and freedom versus fixity and 
control. The presentation of this border 
scarred across Georgia’s sovereign terri-
tory works to incorporate Georgia within 
Europe, while also emphasizing the illegit-
imate nature of the border being demar-
cated there. The local, national and wider 
regional scales are tied together through 
this one construction, which sets limits on 
the possible interpretations made of this 
Russian-backed process of borderization. 
At the same time, it restricts the way in 
which the effects of this process are open 
to amelioration. The discursive construc-
tion of the Berlin Wall works to provide 
the horizon of possibilities within which 
borderization is open to being understood.
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Peзюме
Эдвард Бойл
«Маленькая Берлинская стена» для всех: cross-scale − 
дискурсивная конструкция
С 2013 года российские пограничники возвели загражде-
ния в различных пунктах вдоль административной грани-
цы, отделяющей де-факто существующее государство Юж-
ная Осетия от остальной территории Грузии. Этот процесс 
демаркации границы имел целью, проведя границу между 
двумя территориями, придать некоторую реальность тому, 
что ранее пространственно и административно было фик-
тивным. Пограничное заграждение, о которм идёт речь, 
теперь называют «маленькой Берлинской стеной», срав-
нивая некоторые незначительные секции указанного 
снабжённого колючей проволокой сооружения с с внуши-
тельными бетонными укреплениями, которые в разгар хо-
лодной войны разделяли Восточный и Западный Берлин. 
В статье рассматривается целесообразность идеи дискур-
сивной конструкции, чтобы позволить исследовать влия-
ние этого поверхностного необоснованного сравнения на 
реорганизацию и переформатирование понятия админи-
стративной границы Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) в 
рамках страноведения Европы. Использование термина 
«маленькая Берлинская стена» является результатом как 
физического ограждения части суверенной территории 
Грузии, так и той роли, которую играло падение Берлин-
ской стены в понимании/трактовке Европы в период по-
сле окончания холодной войны. Аналогичным образом по-
следствия этих двух сооружений ощущаются в различных 
масштабах. Начнём с понимании этой границы в качестве 
незаконного отторжения суверенной территории Грузии – 
через её современное формирование как внешней границы 
Европы, что свидетельствует о географическом и хроноло-
гическом разделении контролируемой Тбилиси Грузии с 
тем, что находится на другой стороне этой «нелегальной» 
границы – до прочной интеграции Грузии в Европу.
Очевидные последствия на внешней границе Европы при 
таком использовании дискурсивной конструкции указыва-
ют как на важность пограничных процессов, происходящих 
на периферии региональной географической данности, 
так и на одновременное использование логики движения 
и стабильности в пределах Европы после холодной войны.
Грузия; Южная Осетия; границы; Европа; масштаб; дискур-
сивная конструкция
Résumé
Edward Boyle
Un «petit mur de Berlin» pour tous : construction discur-
sive à travers diverses échelles
Depuis 2013, des Forces de sécurité des frontières russes ont 
construit des clôtures frontalières à divers endroits le long de 
la ligne de démarcation administrative (ABL) qui sépare l’Etat 
de fait de l’Ossétie du Sud du reste du territoire géorgien. Ce 
processus de «frontérisation» a cherché à matérialiser ce qui 
était autrefois une fiction administrative sur le terrain, visant à 
délimiter territorialement le fossé entre les deux communautés. 
La clôture en question est maintenant appelée le «petit mur 
de Berlin», rapprochant intrinsèquement quelques portions de 
clôtures et de barbelés négligeables, en comparaison, aux impo-
santes fortifications de béton qui ont servi à diviser Berlin-Est 
et Berlin-Ouest au plus fort de la guerre froide.
Cet article argumente que la notion d’une construction discur-
sive est utile pour nous permettre d’analyser l’effet de cette 
comparaison apparemment injustifiable sur la manière dont 
l’ABL en est venue à la fois à être façonnée par la géographie 
régionale de l’Europe et à la restructurer. Le déploiement de 
l’idée d’un «petit mur de Berlin» est le résultat à la fois de la 
séparation matérielle d’une partie du territoire souverain 
de la Géorgie par une clôture et du rôle de la chute du mur 
de Berlin dans la perception des frontières dans l’Europe de 
l’après-guerre froide. De même, ses effets se font sentir à divers 
niveaux, allant de la perception de cette frontière comme étant 
une division illégitime du territoire souverain de la Géorgie, à 
la poursuite de sa construction en tant que limite extérieure de 
l’Europe, révélatrice de la division géographique et temporelle 
de la Géorgie contrôlée par Tbilissi de ce qui se trouve de l’autre 
côté de cette frontière «illégale» et incorporant la Géorgie fer-
mement au sein de l’Europe.
Les effets visibles dans ce déploiement de la construction dis-
cursive à la limite extérieure de l›Europe montrent, d›une part, 
l›importance des processus frontaliers qui se produisent à la 
lisière d›une entité géographique régionale et, d›autre part, 
l›emploi simultané des logiques binaires de mouvement et de 
fixité au sein des frontières de l›après guerre froide de l›Europe.
Géorgie; Ossétie du Sud; frontières; Europe; échelle; construction 
discursive
